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RECENT DECISIONS
Bills and Notes-Antecedent Debt-Accommodation Parties-
Defendant Allen embezzled $15,000.00 from his employer, Security
State Bank. The bank was indemnified against such losses by plaintiff.
After discovery of the loss, the bank demanded promissory notes from
defendant Allen to cover the shortage, such notes to be signed by
"reputable and solvent citizens." A note for $8,500.00, dated 12-9-52,
was executed by defendant Allen "and soon afterwards by defendants
Stitgen and Dollard." Plaintiff paid the losses and was assigned the
note. Held, on appeal by plaintiff from judgment for defendant, Stit-
gen, on the note, affirmed. Where a note is given as security for a pre-
existing indebtedness of the maker; and, thereafter, the defendant signs
as accommodation maker, without any further value given, or the li-
ability of the primary maker affected in any manner, the accommodation
maker's obligation is without consideration; and the note is unenforce-
able against him. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Allen,-
Wis.-,74 N.W. 2d 793 (1956).
The decision is the logical consequence of In re Vogel's Estate,'
upon which it is expressly rested. The court's synopsis of the facts in
the earlier case is, however, confused to a degree which makes it ex-
tremely difficult to appreciate the tantalizingly close point of law upon
which both the instant case and the Vogel decision turn.
In the principal case, the Vogel case was synopsized as follows:
"The legal situation is as it was in Estate of Vogel ...,
where a loan was made to the primary maker and his note
given. Some three months later his uncle was induced to sign
the note. We held that the latter signature was given without
consideration."
2
Actually, Paul Vogel was the son of William Vogel. An arrange-
ment was made between father and son whereby the son managed the
father's farm, paid expenses and collected the income in return for
supporting the father for life. Paul Vogel borrowed $800.00 from his
uncle, Sommerfeldt, to pay expenses of the farm. Three weeks after
receipt of the money, at the Vogel homestead, Paul, his wife, and
William Vogel simultaneously executed a note to Sommerfeldt. An
action was brought on the note against the estate of William Vogel.
3
The court found for the defendant on the ground that the original loan
was not founded on any inducement coming from William Vogel; that
1259 Wis. 73, 47 N.W.2d 333 (1950).2 London and Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Allen, -Wis.----, 74 N.W.2d 793
(1956).3 The majority of the facts stated were obtained from the decision in In re
Vogel's Estate, supra, note 1. However the fact of simultaneous execution by
the principal maker and accommodation maker was acquired from the attorney's
briefs.
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the loan was a completed transaction when the money was transferred;
that no further consideration was given nor was the liability of Paul
Vogel affected when William Vogel signed the note.
The Vogel decision and the instant case have but two essential
features in common: the fact that, in both cases, the origin of the debt
lay in a transaction which had been consummated prior to the giving
of the instrument; and the fact that, in both cases, accommodation
signers were procured to join the principal debtor on the note. They
have, on the other hand, two points of distinction (which may well be
distinctions without difference) : in the principal case, the origin of the
debt lay in a tort, whereas in the Vogel case it lay in contract; and,
in the principal case, some two days elapsed between the signature of
the principal debtor on the note and that of his subsequently procured
accommodation signer,4 whereas in the Vogel case the signatures were
simultaneous.
These two decisions affect a practical problem of everyday finance,
e.g. a creditor on a matured debt is faced with a default, and is willing
to extend time for payment, de facto, if he acquires additional security,
but does not wish to bind himself legally to such extension. The
practical method of effecting this result is to accept a demand note
signed by the debtor and a surety. Under a strict rule, as adopted in
both above-cited cases, a debtor is prohibited from obtaining such de
facto extensions under the above circumstances. If such de facto
extension is granted under a demand note, the creditor does not receive
the additional security that he bargained for, and the intentions of the
parties are thereby thwarted.
It may be broadly accepted as the rule of the Vogel case that under
no circumstances can an accommodation signer be held liable on a
negotiable demand note given solely in consideration of and as security
for a pre-existing debt of the accommodated party, absent any partici-
pation, actual or constructive, by the accommodation signer in the
transaction which gave rise to the antecedent debt.
It is significant that, so stated, the rule is entirely unaffected by
the question whether the co-makers (one accommodated, the other
accommodation) sign simultaneously or otherwise. The sole importance
of such a question exists in the case of a note executed by the principal
debtor, delivered, and accepted simultaneously with the originating
transaction. In such a case the later-signing accommodation party is
exempted from liability unless his signature, affixed to the instrument
substantially after execution, delivery, and acceptance, is deemed
simultaneous, i.e., is constructively simultaneous. 5 It will be so deemed,
4 This fact was also obtained from attorney's briefs in the principal case, supra,
note 2.
5 "It seems clear that one who indorses a note in pursuance and consummation of
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in substantially all jurisdictions, where the accommodation signer per-
sonally promised, at or prior to the execution of the instrument, that
he would join in the instrument; and there is little quarrel that, even
where the (or an) accommodation signature is promised only by the
principal debtor, a later signing accommodation party who executes
with knowledge of the promise is liable as a constructively simul-
taneous signer.6 In a few cases, the knowledge element, too, is dis-
pensed with.7
Obviously, however, none of the cases involving the complex con-
cept of constructively simultaneous signatures are pre-existing debt
cases in any real sense of the term. It is the writer's purpose to sug-
gest, not so much that the sometimes-called "stranger rule" s is itself
bad, but that the application of that rule universally to pre-existing
debt cases is illogical, and not necessarily indicated by the authorities
other than the Wisconsin Court.
Certain it is that nothing in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law compels such universal application of the stranger rule. NIL
299 provides:
"An accommodation party is one who has signed the instru-
ment as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without-receiving
value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some
other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a
holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of
taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation
party."
NIL 2510 provides:
"Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value;
and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on de-
mand or at a future time."
Quite evidently, 1hese sections express no exceptions or limitations
a prior agreement between the maker and payee of which he has knowledge,
participates in the original consideration for the note, and is therefore bound
.." Devitt v. Foster, 159 Miss. 687, 132 So. 182 (1931).
Kugle, V. Traders' State Bank of Clebourne, Tex. Civ. App., 252 S.W. 208
(1923).
7 Mitchell v. Planters' Bank, 27 Tenn 216 (1847).
s ".. . the general rule sustained by the great weight of authority is that the
undertaking of one not a party to the original transaction who, in pursuance of
some subsequent arrangement and not by reason of an agreement at the time
of the original transaction of which he has notice or knowledge, signs as a
surety, guarantor, indorser, or co-maker, after the original contract has been
fully executed and delivered, is a new and independent contract, and to be
binding must be supported by a new and independent consideration from that
of the original contract. However, such new consideration need not pass to the
party signing, but may be a benefit or advantage to the party debtor, or a
detriment to the party creditor, on the note.. ." 7 Am. JUR., BILLS AND NoTEs,
§250, pp. 947-948.
9Wis. STATS. (1955) §116.34.
10 Wis. STATS. (1955) §116.30.
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on their stated coverage. It is this fact which has prompted Professor
Britton to contend for what amounts to a complete abrogation of the
stranger rule:
"Section 25 of the N.I.L. deprives, or should deprive every
promisor on a negotiable instrument, no matter how or when
he signed, of the defense of no consideration, so long as he
signed for the purpose of paying or securing his own antecedent
debt or that of another."11
This writer, fully recognizing the force of Britton's argument that
. by recognizing an antecedent debt as consideration in any case,
there is no logical stopping place until the end of the series is reached,' '12
nevertheless suggests a confinement of the stranger rule to cases where
the accommodation signer is a party neither to the transaction giving
rise to the debt, nor to the transaction of original execution, delivery,
and acceptance of the negotiable instrument subsequently given to
secure the same. Such a suggestion appears to have two predominant
virtues: first, it does not run directly counter to the great mass of
existing authority establishing the stranger rule; and second, it lends
appropriate recognition to the independence of a negotiable instrument
as a derivative of the common law specialty.
Authority for this suggestion has been established by two early
cases. In Grocer's Bank v. Penfield,"s the makers signed a note for the
accommodation of the payee who indorsed the note to his creditor as
security for his antecedent debt. The makers were held liable, the
court stating:
".... it is universally conceded that the holder of an accom-
modation note, without restriction as to mode of using it, may
transfer it either in payment or as collateral security for an
antecedent debt, and the maker will have no defense. The
existing debt is a sufficient consideration for the transfer and no
new consideration need be shown. . . . it must be regarded as
settled that an indorsee of a negotiable note made for the accom-
modation of the indorser, but without restriction as to its use,
taking the note in good faith as collateral security for an ante-
cedent debt, and without other consideration, is entitled to the
position of a holder for value, and not affected by the defense
of want of consideration to the maker."
It can be seen from these facts that, although the accommodation
makers were not parties to the transaction giving rise to the debt, they
were parties to the execution, delivery, and acceptance of the security
note; since their names appeared on it as makers. The makers, how-
ever, fall within the stranger rule, as applied by the Wisconsin Court,
11 Britton, BILLS AND NOTES, pp. 384-385.
12 Supra, note 11, p. 384.
"369 N.Y. 502, 25 Am. Rep. 231 (1877).
[Vol. 40
RECENT DECISIONS
by virtue of their not having participated in the original debt-creating
transaction. Thus the New York Court impliedly followed the limita-
tion suggested by the writer. This case has been strictly followed in a
number of subsequent decisions.14
Authority for the proposition has also been established independ-
ently by the case of Jordan v. Goodside.'5 In that case, C had borrowed
funds through the plaintiff. Ten months later, C indorsed a note, given
him for accommodation by the defendant, to the plaintiff. Again the
maker was held liable, the court stating:
"In Smith v. Bibber, 82 Me. 34, 19 Atl. 89, 17 Am. St. Rep.
464, the court declared that were the question a new one in this
state, they would be inclined to adopt the contrary rule which
was that of the federal court and of most other jurisdictions,
but they adhered to the doctrine established here. However,
this doctrine has been abrogated by the N.I.L. §25. This
changed rule was applied in Merrill Trust Co. v. Brown, 122
Me. 101, 119 Atl. 109, a case decided after the passage of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, and is now the law in this state. It
follows that the plaintiff was a holder for value, even if he took
the note as security for a pre-existing debt."
It can be clearly seen under these facts that the maker again was a
party to the security-note transaction, but was a stranger to the debt
transaction. ,It is possible to argue that the maker was not, in the
fullest sense, a stranger; since C had promised the plaintiff, at the time
of the debt transaction, that he would get the plaintiff "something to
protect him." The writer feels, however, that this nebulous phraseology
is insufficient to remove the maker from the stranger category. It
appears rather definitely that the Maine Court also intended to restrict
the application of the stranger rule as suggested above.
The independent significance of a negotiable instrument seems to
have been established by the historical development of the law of bills
and notes. Under Law Merchant, the first repository of the law of
this subject, it appeared that no consideration was necessary for such
instruments.16 Aigler, in discussing the problem, states his conception
of consideration under the Law Merchant as follows:
"If consideration was necessary to secure a binding promis-
sory obligation in the form of a bill or note, it is far more likely
that it was that broader 'consideration' or 'clause' which was a
feature of the Civil Law rather than the consideration that
developed at common law.' '17
14 Maurice v. Fowler, 78 Misc. 357, 138 N.Y.S. 425 (1912); Martin L. Hall Co. v.
Todd, 139 N.Y.S. 111 (1912); In re Hopper-Morgan Co., 154 Fed. 249 (1907).
'5 123 Me. 330, 122 Atl. 859 (1923).
16 Ralph W. Aigler, CASES ON THE LAW OF BILLS AND NoTEs, 2nd Edition, (1955)
p. 411.
1' Supra, note 16.
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The common law courts apparently recognized and maintained the
validity of this position, after absorbing the Law Merchant in the
common law, placing a negotiable note in the category of a specialty
which demanded no consideration."' A bill or note, as a specialty, was
considered independently of any consideration pertaining to the tran-
saction from which it resulted. The constant common law emphasis
upon the necessity of consideration in any contractual-type transaction,
however, led to an inevitable confusion in the case of bills and notes.
As concerns the type of transaction now under consideration, the con-
fusion should have been abrogated by the adoption of N.I.L. §25,19
stating that an antecedent debt constitutes value.
The writer's opinion that the historically established independence
of a negotiable instrument should be maintained is further substanti-
ated by N.I.L. §24,20 i.e., where a bill or note is given as security for
a contract which has been breached, and an action on the security
instrument results, the facts pertaining to the secured contract need
not be affirmatively proven, since only the facts pertaining to the secur-
ity instrument itself are of importance, prima facie.
The Wisconsin Court has recognized that a maker may be liable
on a promissory note given for an antecedent debt. 21 The two Wisconsin
cases 22 under consideration also infer that an accommodation party
who has participated in the original debt transaction may be held liable
on a subsequent security note. A later Wisconsin case2 3 has stated
that a negotiable instrument given in exchange for a pre-existing moral
obligation is a new and independent contract. Based upon a considera-
tion of authority and the historical development of the law of negoti-
able instruments, it seems logical that the court should also hold an
accommodation signer liable who has participated, not in the debt
transaction, but in the security-note transaction, on the theory that such
a signer is not a stranger within the application of the stranger rule.
As a corollary, the stranger rule should be applied only to those cases
in which the accommodation party on the security note has participated
in neither the debt nor the security transaction,'2 or where the accom-
modated person is not a party to the security instrument..22
GEORGE RADLER
1s Supra, note 16.
19 Supra, note 10.
20 "Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a
valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to
have been a party thereto for value." ,VIs. STATS. (1955) §116.29.
21 Elbinger v. Capitol & Teutonia Co., 208 Wis. 163, 242 NA.. 568 (1932).
22 Supra, note 1; supra, note 2.
23 Garvey v. Wenzel, -Wis.- , 76 N.W.2d 291 (1956).
24 Supra, note 8.
25 Turle v. Sargent, 63 Minn. 211, 65 N.W. 349, 56 Am. St. Rep. 475 (1895).
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